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1. Introduction 
Great leaders need crisis situations to gain power to 
(re)act (Genovese, 1979; Rossiter, 1948), but crisis situ-
ations need great leaders in order to be solved as well 
(Tucker, 1968, p. 745, 1981). To put a twist on that 
paradox: there are two extreme ways to perceive and 
conceptualize extraordinary situations and to deal with 
them. On the one hand, a crisis could be seen as an ex-
ogenously given situation for leaders to manage in a 
technocratic or conventional way; on the other, it can 
be seen as a situation generated endogenously by 
leaders acting in an innovative way. While researchers 
usually explore leaders’ responses to exogenous crises, 
such as industrial accidents, natural catastrophes, ter-
rorist attacks or responses to economic or international 
financial crises, our focus is on endogenously generat-
ed and/or shaped crises. The first goal of this paper is 
to emphasize the role of political agency in crisis gen-
eration and in re-defining it, something that is very 
much neglected by approaches focusing on structural 
determinants. Secondly, the paper aims to provide a 
general conceptual typology of the relation between 
political agency and crisis. 
The problem arises from the structure–agency de-
bate. “Agency” is usually understood as a capacity to 
act intentionally, voluntarily upon situations, as a 
property of actors to be able to formulate and imple-
ment decisions. On the other hand, “structure” means 
the situation, context and political environment. It re-
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fers to the conditions within which actors operate and 
seize the opportunities, and which determine or con-
strain their actions. Essentially, structure and agency 
are two sides of the same coin, as they coexist in a po-
litical process. (Hay, 2002, pp. 89-135). A fundamental 
problem for political leadership studies is how the rela-
tionship between the political actors and the environ-
ment in which they find themselves is managed. Calls 
for research into the dilemma of the structure–agency 
problem in leadership studies are not new (Hargrove, 
2004; Jones, 1989; Masciulli, Molchanov, & Knight, 
2009; ‘t Hart & Rhodes, 2014). In this paper, we will 
encounter the structure–agency problem in a more 
concrete setting, that of crises and extraordinary situa-
tions. In a crisis situation, where leadership differs from 
agency in ordinary times, this dualism is more prob-
lematic. At least three different perspectives can be 
distinguished within the literature concerning the rela-
tionship between structure and agency in crisis. Firstly, 
the structuralist approach moves within a chal-
lenge/reaction scheme, where the change of structure 
triggers agency (Structure  Agency). For structuralist 
authors crisis means a more or less objective situation 
for agents, i.e. political leaders remain in a reactive 
role. As Ronald A. Heifetz (1994) notes, leaders define 
the problem, decide how to tackle it, and then work 
towards adaptation of either values, reality or both. 
Leadership is triggered by the emergence of complex 
problems. For Boin, McConnell and ‘t Hart (2008) crises 
are triggered in a variety of ways, but always by external 
or exogenous forces (natural catastrophes, malfunctions 
of a society’s sociotechnical and political administrative 
systems, or by internal or external enemies), or political 
scandals (Boin et al., 2008, p. 3). Recently, Jim Buller and 
Toby S. James (2015) have argued for the analytical pri-
macy of structure on the grounds of philosophical real-
ism. They have emphasized the role of ‘emergent prop-
erties’ of previously unrelated structures that often 
result in outcomes that are unanticipated and difficult to 
control for the agents. 
Secondly, constructivists attribute a greater role to 
political leaders in shaping the situation and they 
transcend the challenge/reaction scheme. They em-
phasize the intersubjective factors of a crisis situation: 
crisis is interpreted by political actors for the broader 
public (Structure  Agency). As Mark Blyth (2003) 
argues, “structures do not come with an instruction 
sheet”, and even exogenous shocks must be interpret-
ed to have a meaning for the people and for politicians 
as well. Keith Grint is interested in the processes 
“through which decision-makers persuade their fol-
lowers, and perhaps themselves, that a certain kind of 
action is required”. He adds that “…leadership involves 
the social construction of the context that both legiti-
mates a particular form of action and constitutes the 
world in the process.…[The question is] not what is the 
situation, but how it is situated.” (Grint, 2005, pp. 
1469-1471, italics original). Wesley W. Widmaier and 
his colleagues aim to give a “constructivist analysis of 
wars and crises, which we define as events which 
agents intersubjectively interpret as necessitating 
change.” (Widmaier, Blyth, & Seabrooke, 2007, p. 748). 
Recalling historical cases Joseph S. Nye emphasizes 
that “…leaders sometimes help to enlarge a crisis and 
exacerbate the distress that triggers the process of 
charisma creation” (Nye, 2008, p. 57). 
A third perspective, usually neglected in the litera-
ture, is the role of agency beyond interpreting an ex-
ternal shock, that is generating crises (Structure  
Agency). This missing case emerges in politics if the 
radicalized version of the constructivist approach is ac-
companied with a robust role of voluntarist political 
agency, where the crisis is “invented” by the agent(s). 
Intersubjective processes of “meaning making” begin 
to play a role after this invention took place. As Hook’s 
(1957) concept of the “event-making man” evaporated 
from the literature, this robust role of political agents is 
taken into consideration only in connection with revo-
lutionary leaders. Robert C. Tucker notes that in the 
case of revolutionary leaders we can see “…how an act 
of leadership can be self-fulfilling: it can help bring 
about the very situation that the leader has diagnosed 
as already existing.” (Tucker, 1981, p. 113). The first 
aim of this paper is to highlight the role of leadership in 
endogenously created crises. 
But what if we conceive these perspectives as just 
different types of relations between leaders and crisis 
situations? In that case, bringing together those per-
spectives would be a legitimate goal, because each can 
be useful in enlightening different types of crises. Bear-
ing this in mind, the second aim of this paper is to es-
tablish a conceptual typology that is able to incorpo-
rate all these approaches. Our central concept in this 
typology is contingency. Relying heavily on the works 
of Kari Palonen (1998, 2001), we describe contingency 
as the nature of relations between structure and agen-
cy. Contingency can serve both as a constraint on politi-
cal action (as in The Prince of Machiavelli) as well as a 
means for such action (as in the works of Max Weber). 
We take crisis, as a situation with an extraordinarily high 
level of contingency, to highlight this “dual nature” of 
contingency for political agency. This concept, in our 
view, is suitable to soften the rigidity of the structure-
agency dualism. In this paper we focus on incumbent 
leaders, who lead crisis governments (Corwin, 1978, p. 
78; Edinger, 1967, p. 15, 1975, p. 257; Kellerman, 1984, 
p. 71; Rossiter, 1948, p. 3) and who make things happen 
that would not happen otherwise (Blondel, 1987, p. 3; 
Cronin, 1980, p. 372; McFarland, 1969, p. 155). 
Based on this conceptual framework, our paper 
provides a general typology of contingency, i.e. the re-
lationship between political agency (leadership) and 
structure/structural change (crisis), and sets out empir-
ical examples within it. Such a typology can serve gen-
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erally “as a heuristic device to enable us to understand 
why those charged with decision-making sometimes 
appear to act in ways that others find incomprehensi-
ble.” (Grint, 2005, p. 1475). More concretely, it can 
help in (1) mapping different perspectives concerning 
the relationship between structural factors and agency 
during crises; (2) to revitalize a somewhat neglected 
third perspective noted above. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we define 
the concept of crisis and give a conceptual differentia-
tion related to contingency. Second, we analyse the 
possible relationships between contingency and politi-
cal action and differentiate between two types of con-
tingency, drawing on Palonen’s comparison of the 
Machiavellian and the Weberian Moments. Third, we 
develop a fourfold typology of the relationship be-
tween political agency and different states of affairs: 
normalcy and three different types of crisis. Each type 
will be highlighted through empirical examples. Finally, 
we draw a few conclusions. 
2. Crisis and Contingency 
First of all, we need to clarify what we mean by crisis. 
One of the recent papers on crisis and leadership de-
fined the former with three criteria: threat, uncertain-
ty, and urgency (Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 
2005). By threat we mean high-stake politics, which 
characterizes crises, vis-a-vis low-stake politics in nor-
mal times. Urgency here means a commanding necessi-
ty of action in the case of crisis, which is absent in the 
case of normality, when the pressure for urgent action 
is not present or low. In this paper, we focus mainly on 
the second component, uncertainty, identifying it as a 
subtype of a broader concept, contingency. Contingen-
cy can mean indeterminacy (“It could be different”), or 
uncertainty (“We cannot know”) (Schedler, 2007). We 
assume that contingency is present both in states of 
the normal functioning of politics and in times of crisis. 
But while in the former it is usually indeterminacy, in cri-
sis situations it can rather be characterized as uncertain-
ty. The factor that distinguishes the two is the presence 
(in case of indeterminacy) of rules, conventions and au-
thorities that reduce the spectrum of possible choices. 
The formulation of Michael Oakeshott properly de-
scribes indeterminacy in the normal state of affairs:  
“But in stipulating general conditions for choosing 
less incidental than the choices themselves, in es-
tablishing relationships more durable than those 
which emerge and melt away in transactions to sat-
isfy a succession of contingent wants, and in articu-
lating rules and duties which are indifferent to the 
outcome of the actions they govern, it may be said 
to endow human conduct with a formality in which 
its contingency is somewhat abated.” (Oakeshott, 
1990, p. 74) 
In a crisis situation it is precisely these “rules and du-
ties” (and conventions, authorities) that become dubi-
ous, thereby making the political situation uncertain.1 
The difference in the nature of uncertainty from 
that of indeterminacy can also be highlighted by the 
Knightian conceptual differentiation between risk and 
uncertainty familiar from economics. While risk is 
measurable and calculable (because conditions are 
known, as in the case of roulette or chess, or generally 
in game theory), uncertainty is not (because conditions 
are not known, and we cannot make predictions). There-
fore, it is not only the higher intensity, but the different 
nature of contingency that differentiates crisis situations 
from normal states Uncertainty, rather than risk, charac-
terizes crisis and extraordinary situations.  
In section 3, drawing on Kari Palonen’s work, we 
will try to relate the concept of contingency to that of 
agency. Thereafter (in section 4), relying on Palonen’s 
differentiation between two types of contingency 
(Machiavellian and Weberian) we try to set up a two-
dimensional theoretical framework for analyzing crisis 
situations and types of political action. The typology 
provides not only a useful analytical framework, but 
reveals the role of leadership in the case of endogenous-
ly created crises, which is neglected in the literature. We 
claim that crises and exceptional situations might be en-
gendered endogenously, by political agency. 
3. Palonen’s Distinction: Background vs. Operative 
Contingency2 
To establish a connection between contingency and 
political agency, we use a work by Kari Palonen (1998) 
as a point of departure. Palonen differentiates be-
tween the “Machiavellian Moment” (cf. Pocock, 1975) 
and what he calls the “Weberian Moment”. His main 
argument, roughly summarized, is that while in the 
                                                          
1 This difference can be exemplified by two different uses of 
the same metaphor. In Michael Oakeshott’s famous formula-
tion, politicians “sail a boundless and bottomless sea” where 
the “enterprise is to keep afloat on an even keel” (Oakeshott, 
1991, p. 60). This can be taken as the general characterization 
of political activity that also applies in the normal state of poli-
tics. The other use can be taken as a paradigm of crisis: politi-
cians in crisis resemble “river oarsmen who…suddenly find 
themselves called upon to navigate their boat in mid-ocean” 
(Tocqueville, 1896, p. 106).  
2 Our reading here relies heavily on Kari Palonen’s distinction 
between Machiavelli and Weber, a distinction to be made clear 
at the end of this section. His reading, in our view, has great 
analytical merits, but The Prince can also be interpreted in a 
different way, i.e. as a work that supposes a more complex re-
lationship between fortuna and virtú (see e.g. Pocock, 1975, 
pp. 156-182), or one that lays a greater emphasis on agency 
and character, and therefore rather stresses the similarities be-
tween the views of Machiavelli and Weber (see e.g. Philp, 
2007, pp. 37-96). However, here our point of interest lies not in 
conceptual historical accuracy, but in analytical usefulness. 
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former contingency is mainly an external challenge for 
political action, in the latter it becomes its constitutive 
element. Here we try to summarize briefly the differ-
ences between these two “Moments” (see Table 1). 
These considerations will serve as the foundation of 
our typology concerning the relationship between po-
litical agency and crises. 
(1) The background of political action in the Machia-
vellian Moment is uncertain. The main problem of The 
Prince is the retention of principalities newly acquired 
through the arms of others and through good fortune. 
As Machiavelli emphasizes, these cases are when the 
situation of the rulers is the most difficult, because they 
cannot rely on traditional legitimacy, only on the “two 
most inconstant and unstable things”. The factors that 
would nudge uncertainty into indeterminacy are appar-
ently missing. Contrary to that, the historical context of 
Weber’s work is a marked by bureaucratization, which 
forms a stable background to political action, abating 
contingency by its rules and standard procedures. 
(2) For Machiavelli, the main threat that political ac-
tion must face is the desolation of fortuna, which is 
compared by him to “raging rivers” in Chapter 25 of The 
Prince. For Weber, the main problem consists not in 
taming the forces of fortuna, but in avoiding the “petrifi-
cation” of bureaucratic structures. Put differently: his 
main concern is with the possibility of politics, not with 
that of order (Palonen, 2001). The difference between 
the two authors is aptly expressed by their uses of met-
aphors: while Machiavelli’s prince has to erect “defences 
and barriers, in such a manner that, rising again, the wa-
ters may pass away by canal, and their force be neither 
so unrestrained nor so dangerous” (Machiavelli, 2008, 
Chapter 25), Weber describes politics as a “strong and 
slow boring of hard boards” (Weber, 2001, p. 128). The 
latter in Palonen’s interpretation means the opening up 
of new horizons for political action. 
(3) The first, vital task for leaders follows from the 
above-mentioned features. For Machiavelli’s prince, it 
is mantenere lo stato, that is, to maintain his power 
and the present form of government. There is undeni-
ably an element of innovation in the Machiavellian 
view: his image of the fox (Machiavelli, 2008, Chapter 
18) implies that fortuna can not only be contained, but 
also utilized to a certain degree, but—at least in Palo-
nen’s interpretation—this is a secondary feature; the 
main concern is still with the exposedness to and the 
preponderance of fortuna. For Weber, the first task of 
a political leader is to create room for manoeuvre 
among bureaucratic constraints. 
(4) It is worth mentioning that both views of political 
action can take pathological forms. For Machiavelli, 
mantenere lo stato without some higher aims that bring 
glory to the prince and benefit to his subjects is detesta-
ble (cf. Skinner, 2002, pp. 143-144). In the same vein, 
Weber is no advocate of adventurous politics that takes 
risks for their own sake. Although he is worried about 
the growth of bureaucratic influence, at the same time 
he also admits its importance as a stable background as 
far as the possibility of politics can be guaranteed. 
(5) As we mentioned before, the main thesis of 
Palonen’s book concerns the position switch of contin-
gency. While in the Machiavellian Moment it is princi-
pally (despite the presence of the figure of the fox) ex-
ternal to political action, a challenge that has to be 
overcome, in the Weberian Moment it becomes an el-
ement of political action itself. Where the foremost 
danger is seen in the ravaging power of fortuna (a 
symbol of contingency), politics is logically directed 
against contingency. But in a bureaucratized world 
contingency is linked with freedom from the bureau-
cratic structure. Therefore, politicians act not against, 
but through contingency. 
(6) As the last point implicates, contingency chang-
es from a background condition (fortuna) into an oper-
ative element. This distinction between background 
and operative contingency will form the basis of our 
analytical typology of the relationship between political 
action and crisis presented in the next part. 
Table 1. Comparison of the Machiavellian and the Weberian moment. 
 Machiavellian Moment Weberian Moment 
Background of political action Uncertain (newly acquired rule) Stable (age of bureaucratization) 
Main threat External shocks (fortuna) Stagnation, “petrification” of 
bureaucratic structures 
Main task of the leader Reduce contingency, assure security 
and order (metaphor: erecting 
“defences and barriers”) 
Create room for manoeuvre 
(metaphor: “boring of hard boards”) 
through increasing contingency 
Pathological form Mere defence of the status quo Constant subversion, irresponsible 
action that endangers the state  
Connection between action and 
contingency 
Acting against contingency (politics = 
Spiel gegen die Kontingenz) 
Acting through contingency (politics = 
Spiel durch die Kontingenz) 
Types of contingency Background contingency (Kontingenz 
des Handelns) 
Operative contingency 
(Kontingenz im Handeln) 
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4. An Analytical Typology and Empirical Examples 
Up to this point, we have claimed that (1) a crisis situa-
tion is marked by the presence of a subtype of contin-
gency: uncertainty; and (2) that contingency can be 
both the background condition and a constitutive ele-
ment of political agency. In this section, first, we will 
set up an analytical typology of the relationship be-
tween political agency and crisis, thereby interrelating 
the two above-mentioned conceptual distinctions. 
Second, we will give empirical examples to make our 
typology more plausible. Our focus will be on the work-
ing of operative contingency through re-interpretation 
of a hitherto exogenous understanding of crisis (quad-
rant C) and through endogenous crisis-generation by 
creative political agency (quadrant D). Although there 
are no clear cases, we hope our examples will help to 
clarify the difference between operative and back-
ground contingency. 
The conceptual analysis of contingency by Palonen 
provides an appropriate starting point to construct an 
analytical typology of the relationship between political 
agency and crisis. The two types of contingency form 
the two dimensions of the matrix in Table 2. As men-
tioned before, we assume—following Oakeshott—that 
there is contingency in every political situation. How-
ever, where both types of contingency are low, we can 
speak of a normal state of affairs (quadrant A). Here 
conventions (using the term in the broadest sense, in-
cluding the usual procedures, behavioural patterns of 
politicians, the legal order etc.) are challenged neither 
by an exogenous shock nor by political agents. In the 
three other quadrants, the sum of the two types of 
contingency are higher; therefore in these cases we 
can speak of crisis situations.3 
                                                          
3 A clarifying note: for Weber, in contrast to the Kairos-
thinkers, the distinction between normal and extraordinary 
situations is not an important one: political chances are ubiqui-
tous. However, when Weber denies the importance of ex-
traordinary situations, he speaks of them as prerequisites for 
political action; while in quadrant C and especially in quadrant 
D of our typology, crises or extraordinary situations are rather 
the outcomes of political action.  
Table 2. Typology of the relationship between political agency and crisis. 
 low  level of background contingency high 
lo
w
 A - normal state of affairs 
1. no shock / crisis 
2. contingency mainly indeterminacy 
3. no exceptional time-stress for decisions and ac-
tions  
4. no threat to norms, institutions, conventions 
5. innovation is not needed 
6. main goal of actors: to follow their aims within 
the given institutional framework 
 
B - crisis as exogenous shock 
1. crisis situation: exogenous shock 
2. contingency mainly uncertainty 
3. exceptional time-stress for decisions and actions 
4. institutions are threatened, but they are defended 
through adjustment 
5. innovation is not needed, conventional crisis man-
agement is applied 
6. main goal of the actor: to immediately reduce the 
level of contingency, overcome exogenous shock 
 
le
ve
l o
f 
o
p
er
at
iv
e 
co
n
ti
n
ge
n
cy
 
D - endogenously generated crisis 
1. crisis situation: endogenously generated crisis, 
no external shock 
2. contingency mainly uncertainty, increased to a 
high level through agency 
3. exceptional time-stress generated by deliberate 
actions 
4. institutions are rebuilt or exchanged for new 
ones 
5. innovation: questioning of conventions and con-
ventional authorities 
6. main goal of the actor: to widen her/his room 
for manoeuvre through increasing the level of con-
tingency 
C - crisis re-defined 
1. crisis situation: exogenous shock and endogenous 
crisis-generation through reinterpretation 
2. contingency mainly uncertainty 
3. exceptional time-stress for decisions and actions 
4. institutions are threatened, and they are restruc-
tured through deliberate action 
5. innovative crisis-management: questioning of con-
ventions and conventional authorities 
6. main goal of the actor: to increase or maintain the 
level of contingency at a level manageable by her-
self/himself 
h
ig
h
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A high level of background contingency is present in 
quadrants B and C. By background contingency we 
mean events that cast doubt on conventions and which 
are exogenous from the point of view of the political 
agent.4 The best examples of exogenous shocks are a 
global economic crisis, a natural catastrophe, or a dec-
laration of war by another country.  
Sense- and meaning-making in crisis situations al-
ways have an important role. But when rules and 
norms are in doubt, the interpretation of the situation 
by political leaders gains extraordinary importance (cf. 
Boin et al., 2005, 2008; Hall, 1993), which enhances the 
role of leadership and political agency. When there is a 
crisis, leadership always has a choice, in an analytical 
sense, between attempting to read events within the 
frame of the existing paradigm, thus trying to reduce 
contingency immediately, and challenging them and 
presenting a new paradigm that offers a new meaning 
of what is going on. Therefore, quadrants B and C can 
be seen as two different strategies for “crisis exploita-
tion” (Boin et al., 2008), articulated at the level of polit-
ical theory. The main difference between our approach 
and previously cited literature on crisis management is 
that we take into account the possibility of political ac-
tors deliberately increasing the stakes (threat), contin-
gency (uncertainty), and the state of emergency (ur-
gency) in a crisis situation, for example through 
political actions or interpretation. We assume that the 
type of crisis mostly depends on interpretation, mean-
ing-making, therefore a crisis triggered by an exoge-
nous factor might be brought either into quadrant B or 
into quadrant C by political agency (redefinition). En-
dogenous crisis generation in quadrant D, however, is a 
case in which crisis is not just interpreted or re-defined, 
but invented.5  
Unlike quadrants A and B, an elevated level of op-
erative contingency is present in quadrants C and D. 
We speak of operative contingency when the political 
actor deliberately acts or speaks in such a way as to 
heighten the level of uncertainty, e.g. by questioning 
conventions or conventional authorities, the existing 
legal order, etc. The latter often entails a paradigm 
change (Hall, 1993; cf. Blyth, 2013)6, i.e. a dramatic 
                                                          
4 Here, we stick once again to Palonen, adopting the viewpoint 
of “politics-as-activity” instead of “politics-as-sphere” (Palonen, 
2003, 2014). Acts of other political actors and consequences of 
their acts are exogenous to a concrete political actor in an ac-
tivity-view, while they would be endogenous within the 
“sphere of politics”. 
5 Our approach can be considered as a constructivist viewpoint, 
which while not ruling out differences between types of crises 
concerning their interpretability, assumes that all of them can 
be shaped by interpretation to a certain degree. 
6 Drawing on Hall, by paradigm we mean an interpretative 
framework of policymaking. “Policymakers customarily work 
within a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not 
only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be 
change in policy-making, comparing to policy adjust-
ment (change of settings) or policy reforms (change of 
instruments, institutions).  
In what follows, each type of relationship between 
political agency and crisis will be explored and a few 
examples will be provided to highlight the main fea-
tures thereof. 
4.1. Quadrant A: Normal State of Affairs 
Quadrant A represents the normal state of affairs, 
when both background and operative contingency is 
low, or “normal”. No shock or crisis happens, there is 
no threat to institutions or conventions, and there is no 
exceptional time-pressure for decisions and actions in 
the political process. Government policies typically 
change only slowly and incrementally through adjust-
ment to the policy line of the incumbents or as reac-
tions to the changing circumstances of the given policy 
area. The changes in the political process are usually 
not evenly distributed, therefore even the “normal” 
level of contingency is not a constant, but a fluctuating 
phenomenon. For example, the democratic succession 
of rulers usually increases the level of contingency, be-
cause early, and even regular elections cause indeter-
minacy in domestic politics. However, it is within the 
“normal” level of contingency which prevails in the par-
liamentary form of government. In other words, “rules 
and duties”, norms and convention are not usually un-
der threat in these cases. Uncertainty is limited to the 
composition of the next parliament or government. 
Although there may be changes in public policies, so 
contingency may rise to a higher level compared to the 
periods between two elections, this is expected and 
accepted as “normal” and falls within the boundaries 
of the predictable way of policy change in parliamen-
tary regimes. One example of the remarkable presence 
of contingency in the normal state of affairs is the 
French Fourth Republic up to the 1958 crisis.7 In one of 
the most penetrating recent French histories Marcel 
Merle (1999, pp. 975-976.) argues that under this re-
gime: 
“governmental instability did not always result in po-
litical instability….Governmental instabilities were 
mainly part of a relative continuity, almost making 
governmental crises into a means of governing.” 
                                                                                           
used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems 
they are meant to be addressing”, states Hall (1993, p. 279.). 
Policy-paradigm is a lense for perceiving problems, a way of 
cognition of the world and an attitude to the potential modes 
of dealing with it. Hence, by paradigm change we mean the 
change of the hierarchy of overarching goals guiding policy. 
7 The First Republic in Italy (1948–1992) can be a similar exam-
ple for contingency as normal state of affairs. 
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In his account, the collapse of the Fourth Republic was 
due not to the frequent governmental changes, but to 
the regime’s inability to decide in colonial issues.  
4.2. Quadrant B: Crisis as Exogenous Shock 
In quadrant B of our crisis typology, the exogenous 
shock that seems to question standard practices and 
policies is managed by the conventional means of crisis 
management. The political aim is to reduce contingen-
cy immediately. This could seem paradoxical, though 
only at first sight: although exogenous shocks always 
seem to cast doubt on conventional authorities and/or 
standard policy-lines, the nature and the gravity of the 
crisis is not self-evident, but open to debate and con-
testation. Crisis managers in quadrant B interpret the 
crisis as an anomaly rather than a systemic problem, 
which justifies their reliance on conventional means of 
crisis management.  
Exogenous shocks, disasters and terrorist attacks all 
demand that leaders act immediately. We provide ex-
amples of prime ministers who had to face an econom-
ic crisis, a terrorist attack, and a natural catasthrope, 
respectively.  
The best example of the strategy of technocratic or 
“crisis-managing” governments (McDonell & Valbruzzi, 
2014) is that of Mario Monti in Italy. Monti was asked 
to form a new government after Berlusconi’s resigna-
tion on 12 November 2011. The ultimate purpose of 
Monti’s technocratic government was to manage the 
Eurozone debt crisis in Italy. The main political parties 
in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies approved 
Monti’s emergency austerity measures (increased tax-
es, labour market and pension reform) to steer Italy 
out of worsening economic conditions and to restore 
market confidence and financial stability. Although he 
promised to step down after the passing of the 2012 
Budget, he launched a centrist and liberal party called 
Civic Choice to run for election. 
Spanish Prime Minister Jose María Aznar and his 
ruling Popular Party (PP) were challenged immediately 
before national elections (14 March 2004) by a series 
of bomb explosions on four trains heading to one of 
Madrid’s main stations which killed 192 people and 
wounded 1,430. Until 11 March the governing party 
had held a comfortable 5 percent lead in the polls over 
rivals. Although the response of government was quick 
enough, the government misinterpreted the crisis situ-
ation and lost the “meaning-making race”. The ruling 
party blamed the Basque separatist movement, ETA 
(Euskadi ta Askatasuna) for the terrorist attacks and, 
instead of facing the facts, doggedly kept to this narra-
tive to the very end. The left-wing opposition Spanish 
Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) easily managed to re-
place the official storyline with its own version, in 
which the bomb attacks were regarded a “punishment” 
by Al-Qaeda for military involvement in the Iraq war 
(even though the troops were sent on only a peace-
keeping mission). After mass demonstrations with 11 
million people (out of a population of 42 million) the PP 
lost the election (Olmeda, 2008). 
4.3. Quadrant C: Crisis Re-Defined 
In quadrant C, the levels of both the background con-
tingency and the operational contingency are high. 
That means: the political actor responds to an external 
shock not by applying conventional countermeasures, 
but instead the incumbent may “raise the stakes”, in-
terpreting the current circumstances not as an anoma-
ly but as a systemic failure. It is important to note that 
this means not merely the rhetorical device of empha-
sizing or exaggerating the gravity of the crisis. That ap-
proach is always followed by the reassurance that we 
know the way out of crisis—which means: the situation 
is a serious one, but still just an anomaly, which can be 
cured by the application of the appropriate, routine 
familiar medicine. Instead of this strategy, our politi-
cian in quadrant C (1) dramatizes the crisis in a more 
systematic way, and (2) couples this dramatization with 
the questioning of the prevailing policy-paradigm (Hall, 
1993) or dominant public philosophy, Zeitgeist (Mehta, 
2011) as well as the conventional authorities. To adopt 
a metaphor used earlier: while the politician in quad-
rant B resembles a captain of a ship trying to escape 
the stormy conditions as quickly as possible, those in 
quadrants C and D consider the possibility that a storm 
is not necessarily a bad condition from the viewpoint of 
the captain. In cases C and D leaders aim to create 
and/or maintain a high level of contingency, which can 
be mastered only by themselves (cf. Schabert, 1989). 
We have two examples below for quadrant C: the 
change of the American foreign- and security policy 
doctrine triggered by the 9/11 crisis by President G. W. 
Bush and the unorthodox economic crisis-management 
of the extravagant Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor 
Orbán. 
Our first example for quadrant C is the 9/11 attack, 
which shook the American nation and created a crisis 
atmosphere for years. The rally round the flag effect 
provided unprecedented support for G. W. Bush in his 
new, war president role (Eichenberg, Stoll, & Lebo, 
2006; Hetherington & Nelson, 2003): he became tem-
porarily charismatic (Greenstein, 2008). President Bush 
gave a determined policy-answer, by setting up new 
authorities and agencies (Department of Homeland Se-
curity) as well as by passing through new legislation 
(US Patriot Act) and by using Presidential War Power, 
based on Constitutional tradition but also legitimized 
by Congressional authorization acts. The 9/11 attack 
was conventionally interpreted as an exogenous chal-
lenge which caused a so-called “incomprehensible cri-
sis” (Boin et al., 2008, p. 19.), and which provided the 
incumbent with a relatively wide space for political in-
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terpretation and framing. The “War on Terror”, and the 
“Axis of evil” were original frames for the Bush Doc-
trine, which turned out to be a new policy-paradigm—
it introduced a new era in the American foreign- and 
security policy and in international relations. The new 
policy included the concept of pre-emptive strikes, uni-
lateralism and democratic regime change, which has 
some antecedents in American exceptionalism (Nagan 
& Hammer, 2004). Bush transformed and extended his 
role as war president and turned it into an extensive 
executive unilateralism, using for example presidential 
signing statements extensively to suspend the applica-
tion of Congressional laws in public administration 
(Galvin, 2009). The global “War on Terror” aimed to 
reduce background contingency. But the preventive 
military actions against terrorist suspects, the surveil-
lance and detainment, the invasion of Afghanistan and 
Iraq, the replacement of a multilateral policy in inter-
national relations with unilateral US dominance (which 
caused a dissensus even within NATO) meant the in-
crease of operative contingency in world politics. Bush 
continuously raised the stakes, but by 2005–2006 he 
lost support within Congress, was challenged by the 
Supreme Court, and for the last years of his presidency 
he became a lame duck. 
Our second example is the Hungarian Prime Minis-
ter, Viktor Orbán’s unorthodox financial policy from 
2010 onwards. In contrast to the conventional crisis-
management of his predecessor, Gordon Bajnai, Orbán 
provided an unorthodox policy to stabilize the budget 
and to finance the sovereign debt. After his party 
Fidesz achieved a landslide victory, gaining 53 % of the 
votes and more than two-thirds of the parliamentary 
seats in the 2010 general elections, Orbán used the 
opportunity to radically re-interpret both the nature of 
crisis and the suitable crisis-management. He framed 
his parliamentary “supermajority” in a quasi-
revolutionary context (“revolution in the polling-
booths”) and relying on it he launched a new regime. 
As newly elected Prime Minister, first he introduced a 
dramatic crisis narrative (e.g. he compared Hungary to 
Greece) and applied new, innovative instruments to re-
spond to the crisis. Although Orbán kept the budget 
deficit below 3% of GDP, which was a requirement of 
the European Union, he challenged a few conventional 
policy measures and questioned conventional authori-
ties. In one parliamentary speech he announced: 
“There is no one to copy, no example to follow. At 
this moment, there are no ready and useful text-
books, at best their contours are being sketched. 
The new recipes have to be invented by us, during 
our everyday struggles. It’s a sweaty job.”8 
                                                          
8 Speech for Urgent and Topical Issues Debate, October 24th 
2011. Retrieved from http://parlament.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_ 
Orbán inserted the problem of budget deficit and in-
debtedness into a broader crisis narrative in an innova-
tive way. In this narrative he combined first, the interna-
tional financial crisis of 2008, second, the domestic 
political crisis triggered by the former socialist Prime 
Minister, Gyurcsány’s Őszöd “lying speech” in 2006 
(which was accompanied with enduring anti-
government demonstrations and street violence), and 
third, the transformation in the world economy (glob-
alized financial capitalism) and the decline of the Euro-
pean Union in a global context. Reframing the financial 
crisis from an exogenous to endogenous phenomenon, 
Orbán was able to instrumentalize the crisis to blame 
the left, the liberals, and international organizations 
like the IMF, and successfully legitimized the revolu-
tionary measures he implemented after getting into 
power. Through his “freedom fight” Orbán refused to 
take new parts of the IMF credit line, and refused to 
accept the IMF and the EU advice on what fiscal and 
economic policy should be followed. Instead of reduc-
ing contingency through implementing the advised ad-
justment and policy-reforms accompanied by a new 
IMF loan, Orbán adopted a more risk-taking policy in 
financing sovereign debt. But this way, being freed 
from the control of international financial authorities 
(the IMF), Orbán gained a wider room for manoeuvre 
in domestic politics.9 Orbán framed his endeavours to 
reclaim Hungary’s sovereignty vis-a-vis multinational 
firms, international financial institutions and banks as 
well as institutions such as the IMF and the EU. Con-
flicts with such actors increased uncertainty further, 
and this was exacerbated by the opening to the East 
and to Russia, which was detrimental to relations with 
the USA, though it ensured political support from Hun-
garians with strong national feelings. However, deep-
ening conflicts and increasing contingency by political 
agency was a stratagem to create advantages in do-
mestic politics. Therefore instead of bringing back the 
normalcy of the pre-crisis era, Orbán applied extraor-
dinary measures on a permanent base. Instead of ap-
plying pure policy-adjustment to restore the situation 
ex ante, he developed new policies but also a wider po-
litical paradigm10 and successfully mobilized people to 
support it among the electorate. By and large, Orbán 
                                                                                           
naplo.naplo_fadat?p_ckl=39&p_uln=122&p_felsz=10&p_szove
g=v%E1ls%E1g&p_felszig=10 
9 His revolutionary measures included crisis taxes on sectors 
like banking, telecommunication, or commercial industry, or 
reducing utility prices, but also a massive state intervention 
even in market and property relations, changing the relation 
between state and society and drafting and voting on a consti-
tution. 
10 Instead of policy-paradigm (Hall, 1993), which refers to a 
specific policy field, we can speak about an ideological or gen-
eral political paradigm in Orbán’s case, which includes the 
change in political thinking and philosophy of government in a 
more general sense. 
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can be regarded an example of a politician who played 
not only against (background) contingency, but 
through (operative) contingency at the same time. In 
his 2014 Tusványos speech Orbán revealed his attitude 
towards contingency (as evidence for his view, he both 
mentions external shocks and policy measures of his 
government): 
“we are living in a world in which anything can hap-
pen….It is practically impossible to forecast events 
precisely or within an insignificant margin of er-
ror.”11 
4.4. Quadrant D: Endogenously Generated Crisis 
The situation presented by Quadrant D is reflected only 
occasionally in the literature. In fact, it is the least ob-
vious or tangible case in our typology. In quadrant D 
there is no exogenous shock or external threat; the cri-
sis is generated endogenously by political actors to 
broaden their room for manoeuvre. Uncertainty is in-
creased to a high level through deliberate agency (op-
erative contingency). There is an exceptional time-
stress generated by deliberate actions as well. The 
main goal of the key actor through these innovative ac-
tions is to question conventions and conventional au-
thorities. The aim is not simply politicking but to change 
the balance of power, undermine their rivals’ structural 
position, rebuild institutions or exchange them for new 
ones (e.g. constitution-making, revolutionary changes). 
Two examples are provided below to highlight the main 
features of endogenously generated crises. 
Our first example is the “constitutional game” 
played by French president Charles de Gaulle in 1962 
(Gaffney, 2010, pp. 40-44). By this year he had solved 
the Algerian question (though with a policy switch, ra-
ther than the way he promised), and the rebellion of 
the army was also not an issue anymore. In terms of 
our categories: the elevated level of background con-
tingency that brought de Gaulle to power in 1958 was 
gone, the normal state of affairs seemed to be return-
ing. In this political environment, he began to “stir up 
the calm waters” around himself. Firstly, he alienated 
his pro-European political allies (the Christian demo-
cratic MRP party) with his provocative anti-European 
speech on 15 May. His motives were clear: de Gaulle 
had a different vision of the republic to both his allies 
and his opposition. As Gaffney puts it: “1962 was a 
dramatic showdown between de Gaulle wanting to re-
inforce personality politics and almost everyone else 
trying to dedramatize the republic” (Gaffney, 2010, pp. 
                                                          
11 Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the 25th Bálványos 
Summer Free University and Student Camp. Retrieved from 
http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-
minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-
the-25th-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-student-camp 
42). His strategy was to “move away from some forms 
of support, to move towards new policy positions” 
(Gaffney, 2010, p. 41). The second step in this process 
was the announcement of a referendum on the direct 
election of the president. After every party apart from 
his own united and overturned de Gaulle’s prime min-
ister, he dissolved the National Assembly, and sched-
uled the new elections after the referendum. He ap-
proached the people in an unconstitutional manner: 
“There was no basis in his own constitution for what he 
was doing; what he was doing was asserting the cen-
trality of his own action” (Gaffney, 2010, p. 42).12 At 
the end, he clearly won his self-arranged showdown, 
triumphing both at the referendum and at the follow-
ing elections. He successfully used operative contin-
gency to ram through and solidify his political vision. 
The second example for quadrant D is Viktor 
Orbán’s constitution-making and constitutional policy 
in Hungary between 2010 and 2014, which is an illumi-
nating case for endogenous crisis-generation. But what 
counts as extraordinary in constitutional politics? Con-
stitution-making is extraordinary by definition, since it 
means changing the “rules of the game”, when the 
usually invisible pouvoir constituent (constitution-
making power), i.e. the political sovereign, comes to 
the fore to be activated (Ackerman, 1998). This excep-
tional power, however, is supposed to withdraw and 
give way to normal politics again, after it has done its 
work. Therefore, constitutional politics is also a form of 
extraordinary situations, like crisis, when the existing 
norms, institutions and rules are under threat, a high 
level of contingency is present, and therefore there is 
an urgency to re-establish stability according to the 
scheduled new order. However, the extraordinary 
qualities of constitution-making—threat, contingency 
and urgency—can be reduced to a minimum, if it is car-
ried out by an inclusive political consensus of the major 
political actors, elite groups and other stakeholders.13 
This way, constitution-making can be tamed: contin-
gency is reduced and it is pushed back to the world of 
normal politics, i.e. to quadrant A in our typology. The 
constitutional policy of Orbán, however, was far from 
this “domesticated”, consensual version of policy-
making. The unilateral constitutional changes and the 
accompanying legislation modified the balance of 
powers, curtailed the power of control institutions like 
the Constitutional Court and the ombudsman, weak-
ened the independence of the judiciary and introduced 
a more majoritarian electoral system. It also changed 
the relation between state and society and weakened 
                                                          
12 This unconstitutional strategy clearly separates the case 
from quadrant A. De Gaulle’s strategy clearly transgressed the 
normal state of affairs. 
13 A consensual constitution-making can be a long-lasting pro-
cess, where there is time for deliberation and/or bargaining of 
the parties, in order to reduce contingency and threat. 
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the separation of Church and State. All of these chang-
es, which were carried out in a style of emergency leg-
islation, threatened the social and political status quo 
of post-communist politics, and questioned the con-
ventions and conventional authorities of the post-1990 
Hungarian regime. This constitutional revolution was 
neither the consequence of an external shock, nor that 
of a deep internal constitutional crisis. It was endoge-
nously generated by Orbán’s creative political leader-
ship and framing of the situation. Through the policy of 
permanent constitutional amendments and legislative 
dumping Orbán kept the level of contingency high and 
widened his room for manoeuvre to such a great ex-
tent as was unprecedented in Hungary since the 1989–
1990 democratic transition. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper aimed to investigate the relation between 
contingency and political agency. Institutions, including 
norms, conventions and even the Zeitgeist are usually 
regarded as constraints of agency. In crisis, however, 
institutions become malleable and may be shaped by 
political agency. What is an institutional constraint for 
most political actors is often formed and generated 
through operative contingency by political agency, as 
our examples for endogenous crisis-generation and the 
re-definition of the crisis confirmed. Contingency too 
can be both a problem to overcome or a means of po-
litical action. Why, in fact, do creative leaders increase 
contingency? As we have seen, to increase contingency 
might have strategic purposes, such as: to widen their 
room for manoeuvre; to question the prevailing policy-
paradigm or dominant public philosophy and to offer a 
new paradigm of interpretation of the crisis; to de-
legitimize or blame conventional authorities; to offer / 
apply a new kind of crisis-management; to restructure 
power relations. 
The role of contingency depends on the abilities 
and goals of the political actor who faces the crisis sit-
uation (or creates one). Technocrats, like Monti, were 
trying to “erect defences and barriers” against fortuna, 
while the agency of de Gaulle or Orbán can rather be 
characterized as “boring the hard boards” of the insti-
tutional arrangement, economic conventions, and au-
thorities. As we saw in their cases, political leaders can 
not only utilize the higher level of contingency to cre-
ate a new arrangement (a new state of normalcy) 
shaped to their wants; they can also try to incorporate 
an elevated level of contingency into everyday politics, 
making the state of exception permanent.  
This paper aimed to contribute to the field at two 
levels. On the theoretical one, two contributions can 
be emphasized. Firstly, we introduced a conceptual ty-
pology that offers an overview of the approaches deal-
ing with the relationship between crisis and political 
agency. This typology in our view can to a certain ex-
tent alleviate the stark distinction between structure 
and agency through using the same concept (that of 
contingency) to describe both of them. Contingency, as 
we have seen, can be a constraining element of the 
structure that forces the politician to take a certain 
course of action (background contingency). But at the 
same time it can become operative, if the political ac-
tor wants and is able to take risk (Weber), or continual-
ly makes order and recreates chaos (Schabert, 1989). 
The views of Schabert and Weber point toward a 
“monist” understanding of political action, where con-
tingency permeates everything and where it is both the 
barrier to and an element of agency. This view can be 
contrasted with the “dualist view”, where structures 
and agency are starkly separated, and contingency is a 
feature of the structure, and the only task of political 
agency can be to abate it. Secondly, the aim of the ty-
pology was not just to add another theoretical per-
spective to the existing ones (it was not just an end in 
itself), but it also served as means to call attention to a 
potential relationship between agency and crisis that 
has been largely passed over by literature. This rela-
tionship is the most voluntaristic—and the “most clear-
ly Weberian”—one, where there is no exogenous shock 
present, and leaders generate crisis situations them-
selves (quadrant D). 
On the empirical level, two contributions can be 
mentioned again. Firstly, our typology seems to be use-
ful in comparing different strategies of politicians in 
roughly similar settings. Monti and Orbán both had to 
tackle economic consequences of the European sover-
eign debt crisis and the Great Recession, following 
from the global financial crisis of 2007-08. Although dif-
ferences in the structural context could be important 
to different actor strategies, in this case, the difference 
between strategies is so profound that only structural 
factors could not account for it. While Orbán incorpo-
rated the economic problems into a wider civilisational 
crisis-narrative, thereby adding operative contingency 
to the shakiness of international economic background 
to legitimate extraordinary measures, Monti’s strategy 
was to immediately reduce background contingency by 
applying to the conventional best practice of economic 
crisis management. The same can be said about the dif-
ference between the Bush and the Aznar case. While 
the former succeeded in widening his room for ma-
noeuvre after the 9/11 attacks by introducing the “war 
on terror” narrative to legitimate the policy change ini-
tiated later, Aznar sticked to the conventional Spanish 
governmental reactions after a terrorist attack by 
blaming ETA to defend his political position in the Iraq 
war. This difference between situations meant serious 
consequences for leaders. 
Secondly, by shortly analyzing the cases of de 
Gaulle and Orbán in quadrant D, we tried to highlight a 
specific type of voluntaristic crisis generation under 
democratic circumstances: that of the “constitutional 
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game”. We should end with two further remarks on 
these cases. On the one hand, it could be an interesting 
task both for leadership studies and democratic theory 
to uncover further types of voluntaristic crisis genera-
tion in modern democracies. On the other hand, the 
differences between these “constitutional games” 
could also be worth further research. We touched only 
on one difference: while de Gaulle increased operative 
contingency only for a short period, to arrange a 
“showdown” with his political opponents and to intro-
duce a new state of normalcy, Orbán tried to make the 
elevated level of contingency permanent, thereby con-
verting the Hungarian constitutional settlement into 
some kind of a perpetuum mobile. 
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